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Abstract Weconsider the problemof allocating sets of objects to agents and collecting
payments. Each agent has a preference relation over the set of pairs consisting of a
set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-
linear preferences describe environments where thewealth effect is non-negligible: the
payment level changes agents’ willingness to pay for swapping sets.We investigate the
existence of efficient and strategy-proof rules. A preference relation is unit-demand
if given a payment level, for each set of objects, the most preferred one in the set is
at least as good as the set itself; it is multi-demand if given a payment level, when an
agent receives an object, receiving some additional object(s) makes him better off. We
show that if a domain contains enough variety of unit-demand preferences and at least
one multi-demand preference relation, and if there are more agents than objects, then
no rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy
for losers on the domain.
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1 Introduction
Weconsider an object assignment problemwithmoney.Each agent receives a (possibly
empty) set of objects and, possibly, paysmoney for the set. He has a preference relation
over the set of pairs consisting of a set of objects and a payment. An allocation specifies
how the objects are allocated and how much each agent pays. An (allocation) rule is a
mapping from a class of admissible preference profiles, which we call a “domain,” to
the set of allocations. An allocation is efficient if, without reducing the total payment,
no other allocation makes all agents at least as well off and at least one agent better off.
A rule is efficient if it always selects an efficient allocation. A rule is strategy-proof
if, for each agent, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report his true preferences. We
investigate the existence of efficient and strategy-proof rules.
Our model can be viewed as a multi-object auction model. Much of the literature on
auction theory assumes preferences to be “quasi-linear.” Thismeans that the valuations
over sets of objects are not affected by payment level. On the quasi-linear domain,
the so-called “VCG rules” (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973) are efficient
and strategy-proof, and they are the only rules satisfying these properties (Holmström
1979).
As Marshall (1920) demonstrates, preferences are approximately quasi-linear if
payments are sufficiently low. However, in important applications of auction theory
such as spectrum license allocation, house allocation, etc., prices are often equal to
or exceed agents’ annual revenues. Excessive payments for objects may impair an
agent’s ability to purchase complements for an effective use of the objects, and thus
may influence the benefit the agent derives from the objects. Another reason why
preferences may not be quasi-linear is that an agent may need a loan to be able to pay
high prices, and typically financial costs are nonlinear in borrowing.1,2
Another common assumption is the “unit-demand” property.3 It says that given a
payment level, for each set of objects, the most preferred one in the set is at least as
good as the set itself. For unit-demand preferences, there exists theminimumWalrasian
equilibrium price, which is lower than any otherWalrasian equilibrium price. Thus, on
the “unit-demand domain,” minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rules are well-defined.
A minimum price Walrasian (MPW ) rule always selects an allocation associated with
the minimum price Walrasian equilibria for each preference profile. The MPW rules
are strategy-proof on the unit-demand domain (Demange andGale 1985). It is straight-
forward to see that theMPW rules satisfy the following additional two properties: One
is individual rationality, which says that each agent finds his assignment at least as
desirable as getting no object and paying nothing. The other is no subsidy for losers,
which says that the payment of an agent who receives no object is nonnegative. On
the unit-demand domain, when there are more agents than objects, the MPW rules are
1 See Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) for numerical examples.
2 Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) also discuss the importance of the analysis under non-quasi-linear prefer-
ences. Also see Sakai (2008) and Baisa (2013) for more examples of non-quasi-linear preferences.
3 For example, see Andersson and Svensson (2014), Andersson et al. (2015), and Tierney (2015).
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the only rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no
subsidy for losers (Morimoto and Serizawa 2015).4
Although the unit-demand assumption is suitable in some important cases such as
house allocation, etc., in many other cases, some agents may well wish to receive more
than one object, and indeed, many authors have analyzed such situations.5
Now, a natural question arises. On a domain that is neither quasi-linear nor unit-
demand, do efficient and strategy-proof rules exist? This is the questionwe address. To
state our result, we need an additional property of preferences. A preference relation
satisfies the multi-demand property if given a payment level, when an agent receives
an object, receiving some additional object(s) makes him better off. We show that
when there are more agents than objects, on any domain that contains enough variety
of unit-demand preferences and at least one multi-demand preference relation, no rule
satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, andno subsidy for losers.
Inmost impossibility results in the literature on strategy-proofness, the incompatibility
of a list of properties of rules is established on a fixed domain.6 On the other hand, our
result is more general in the sense that the incompatibility of our properties holds on
any domain containing enough variety of unit-demand preferences and some multi-
demand preferences.
This article is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the model and basic
definitions. In Sect. 3, we introduce the unit-demandmodel and the richness condition.
In Sect. 4, we define the minimum price Walrasian rule. In Sect. 5, we state our result
and show the sketch of the proof. Sect. 6 concludes. All the proofs appear in the
Appendix.
2 The model and definitions
There are n ≥ 2 agents and m ≥ 2 objects. We denote the set of agents by N ≡
{1, . . . , n} and the set of objects by M ≡ {1, . . . ,m}. Let M be the power set of M .
With abuse of notation, for each a ∈ M , we may write a to mean {a}. Each agent
receives a subset of M and pays some amount of money. Thus, the agents’ common
consumption set is M × R and a generic (consumption) bundle for agent i is a pair
zi = (Ai , ti ) ∈ M × R. Let 0 ≡ (∅, 0).
Each agent i has a complete and transitive preference relation Ri over M× R. Let
Pi and Ii be the strict and indifference relations associated with Ri . A typical class
of preferences is denoted by R. We call Rn a domain. The following are standard
conditions of preferences.
Moneymonotonicity:For each Ai ∈ M and each pair ti , t ′i ∈ Rwith ti < t ′i , (Ai , ti ) Pi
(Ai , t ′i ).
4 Note that the unit-demand domain contains non-quasilinear preferences, and thus the result byHolmström
(1979) does not apply
5 For example, see Gul and Stacchetti (1999, 2000), Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002), Pápai (2003),
Ausubel (2004, 2006), Mishra and Parkes (2007), Vries et al. (2007), and Sun and Yang (2006, 2009,
2014).
6 For example, Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975), etc.
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First object monotonicity: For each ({a}, ti ) ∈ M × R, ({a}, ti ) Pi (∅, ti ).
Possibility of compensation: For each (Ai , ti ) ∈ M × R and each A′i ∈ M, there are
t ′i , t ′′i ∈ R such that (Ai , ti ) Ri (A′i , t ′i ) and (A′i , t ′′i ) Ri (Ai , ti ).
Continuity: For each zi ∈ M × R, the upper contour set at zi , UCi (zi ) ≡ {z′i ∈
M×R : z′i Ri zi }, and the lower contour set at zi , LCi (zi ) ≡ {z′i ∈ M×R : zi Ri z′i },
are both closed.
Free disposal: For each (Ai , ti ) ∈ M×R and each A′i ∈ Mwith A′i ⊆ Ai , (Ai , ti ) Ri
(A′i , ti ).
Definition 1 A preference relation is classical if it satisfies money monotonicity, first
object monotonicity, possibility of compensation, and continuity.
LetRC be the class of classical preferences.Wecall (RC )n the classical domain. Let
RC+ be the class of classical preferences satisfying free disposal.Obviously,RC+  RC .
Lemma 1 holds for classical preferences. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Let Ri ∈ RC and Ai , A′i ∈ M. There is a continuous function
Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ·)) : R → R such that for each ti ∈ R, (A′i , Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti ))) Ii (Ai , ti ).
For each Ri ∈ RC , each zi ∈ M × R, and each Ai ∈ M, we call Vi (Ai ; zi ) the
valuation of Ai at zi for Ri . By money monotonicity, for each Ri ∈ RC and each pair
(Ai , ti ), (A′i , t ′i ) ∈ M × R, (Ai , ti ) Ri (A′i , t ′i ) if and only if Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti )) ≤ t ′i .
Definition 2 A preference relation Ri ∈ RC is quasi-linear if for each pair
(Ai , ti ), (A′i , t ′i ) ∈ M×R and each t ′′i ∈ R, (Ai , ti ) Ii (A′i , t ′i ) implies (Ai , ti + t ′′i ) Ii
(A′i , t ′i + t ′′i ).
Let RQ be the class of quasi-linear preferences. We call (RQ)n the quasi-linear
domain. Obviously, RQ  RC .
Remark 1 Let Ri ∈ RQ . Then,
(i) there is a valuation function vi : M → R+ such that vi (∅) = 0, and for each
pair (Ai , ti ), (A′i , t ′i ) ∈ M × R, (Ai , ti ) Ri (A′i , t ′i ) if and only if vi (A′i ) − t ′i ≤
vi (Ai ) − ti , and
(ii) for each (Ai , ti ) ∈ M × R and each A′i ∈ M, Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti )) − ti = vi (A′i ) −
vi (Ai ).
Nowwe define important classes of preferences. The following property formalizes
the notion that given a payment level, an agent desires to consume at most one object.
Definition 3 A preference relation Ri ∈ RC satisfies the unit-demand property if for
each (Ai , ti ) ∈ M × R with |Ai | > 1, there is a ∈ Ai such that (a, ti ) Ri (Ai , ti ).7,8
7 Given a set X , |X | denotes the cardinality of X .
8 Gul and Stacchetti (1999) define the unit-demand property for quasi-linear preferences. In their model,
a preference relation Ri ∈ RQ satisfies the unit-demand property if for each Ai ∈ M with |Ai | > 1,
vi (Ai ) = maxa∈Ai vi (a).
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Fig. 1 Unit-demand preference relation
The condition means that given a payment level, for each set of objects, the most
preferred one in the set is at least as good as the set itself. Note that it is possible
that when an agent with a unit-demand preference relation receives an object and
his payment is fixed, an additional object makes him better off. However, this occurs
only when he prefers the additional object to the original one. Figure 1 illustrates a
unit-demand preference relation.
Let RU be the class of unit-demand preferences. We call (RU )n the unit-demand
domain. Obviously, RU  RC .
We also consider a property that formalizes the notion that given a payment level,
an agent desires to consume several objects.
Definition 4 A preference relation Ri ∈ RC satisfies the multi-demand property if
for each ({a}, ti ) ∈ M×R, there is Ai ∈ M such that a ∈ Ai and (Ai , ti ) Pi ({a}, ti ).
The condition says that given a payment level, when an agent receives an object,
receiving some additional object(s) makes him better off. Note that given a payment
level, even if an agent has a multi-demand preference relation, when he receives a set
consisting of several objects, he may find it worse than each object in the set. Figure 2
illustrates a multi-demand preference relation.
LetRM be the class ofmulti-demand preferences.We call (RM )n themulti-demand
domain. The following are examples of preferences satisfying the multi-demand prop-
erty.
Example 1: k-object-demand preferences. Given k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, a preference rela-
tion Ri ∈ RC satisfies the k-object-demand property if (i) for each (Ai , ti ) ∈ M × R
with |Ai | < k, and each a ∈ M\Ai , (Ai ∪ {a}, ti ) Pi (Ai , ti ), and (ii) for each
(Ai , ti ) ∈ M × R with |Ai | ≥ k, there is A′i ⊆ Ai with |A′i | = k such that
(A′i , ti ) Ri (Ai , ti ).9 Clearly, for each k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, preferences satisfying the
k-object-demand property satisfy the multi-demand property.
9 In Gul and Stacchetti (1999), this notion is called k−satiation.
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Fig. 2 Multi-demand preference relation
Example 2: Substitutes and complements. Suppose that the set of objects are divided
into two non-empty sets K and L , and agent i with a preference relation Ri views
objects a and b as substitutes if both a and b are in the same set, and as complements
if a and b are in different sets. For example, objects in K can be pens and objects in
L can be notebooks. Formally, Ri satisfies the following property: For each Ai ∈ M
with |Ai | > 1 and each ti ∈ R, if Ai ⊆ K or Ai ⊆ L , then there is a ∈ Ai such
that (Ai , ti ) Ii (a, ti ), and otherwise, for each a ∈ Ai , (Ai , ti ) Pi (a, ti ). Clearly, this
preference relation Ri satisfies the multi-demand property.
Some preferences in RC violate both of the unit-demand property and the multi-
demand property.
Example 3: (Fig. 3). A preference relation violating the unit-demand property and the
multi-demand property. Let Ri ∈ RC be such that for each a ∈ M and each ti ∈ R,
Vi (a; (∅, ti )) = ti + 5, and for each Ai ∈ M with |Ai | > 1, and each ti ∈ R,
Vi (Ai ; (∅, ti )) =
{
ti + 5 if ti ≥ −5,
1
2 (ti + 5) otherwise.
Then, for each pair a, b ∈ M and each ti ∈ R with ti < −5, Vi ({a, b}; (∅, ti )) =
1
2 (ti+5) > ti+5 = Vi (a; (∅, ti )) = Vi (b; (∅, ti )), and thus, we have ({a, b}, ti+5) Pi
(a, ti +5) Ii (b, ti +5). Thus, Ri does not satisfy the unit-demand property. Moreover,
for each a ∈ M , each Ai ∈ M with a ∈ Ai , and each ti ∈ R with ti ≥ −5,
Vi (Ai ; (∅, ti )) = ti + 5 = Vi (a; (∅, ti )), and thus, we have (Ai , ti + 5) Ii (a, ti + 5).
Thus, Ri does not satisfy the multi-demand property.
An object allocation is an n-tuple A ≡ (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Mn such that Ai ∩ A j = ∅
for each i, j ∈ N with i = j . We denote the set of object allocations byA. A (feasible)
allocation is an n-tuple z ≡ (z1, . . . , zn) ≡ ((A1, t1), . . . , (An, tn)) ∈ (M×R)n such
that (A1, . . . , An) ∈ A. We denote the set of feasible allocations by Z . Given z ∈ Z ,
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Fig. 3 Ri in Example 3
we denote the object allocation and the agents’ payments at z by A ≡ (A1, . . . , An)
and t ≡ (t1 . . . , tn), respectively, and we also write z = (A, t).
A preference profile is an n-tuple R ≡ (R1, . . . Rn) ∈ Rn . Given R ∈ Rn and
i ∈ N , let R−i ≡ (R j ) j =i .
An allocation rule, or simply a rule on Rn is a function f : Rn → Z . Given a
rule f and R ∈ Rn , we denote the bundle assigned to agent i by fi (R) and we write
fi (R) = (Ai (R), ti (R)).
Now, we introduce standard properties of rules. The efficiency notion here takes the
planner’s preferences into account and assumes that he is only interested in his revenue.
Formally, an allocation z ≡ ((Ai , ti ))i∈N ∈ Z is (Pareto-)efficient for R ∈ Rn if there
is no feasible allocation z′ ≡ ((A′i , t ′i ))i∈N ∈ Z such that (i) for each i ∈ N , z′i Ri
zi , (ii) for some j ∈ N , z′j Pi z j , and (iii)
∑
i∈N t ′i ≥
∑
i∈N ti .
The first property states that for each preference profile, a rule chooses an efficient
allocation.
Efficiency: For each R ∈ Rn , f (R) is efficient for R.
Remark 2 By money monotonicity and Lemma 1, the efficiency of allocation z is
equivalent to the property that there is no allocation z′ ≡ ((A′i , t ′i ))i∈N ∈ Z such that
(i′) for each i ∈ N , z′i Ii zi , and (ii′)
∑
i∈N t ′i >
∑
i∈N ti .
The second property states that no agent benefits from misrepresenting his prefer-
ences.
Strategy-proofness: For each R ∈ Rn , each i ∈ N , and each R′i ∈ R,
fi (R) Ri fi (R′i , R−i ).
The third property states that an agent is never assigned a bundle that makes him
worse off than he would be if he had received no object and paid nothing.
Individual rationality: For each R ∈ Rn and each i ∈ N , fi (R) Ri 0.
The fourth property states that the payment of each agent is always nonnegative.
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No subsidy: For each R ∈ Rn and each i ∈ N , ti (R) ≥ 0.
The final property is a weaker variant of the fourth: If an agent receives no object,
his payment is nonnegative.
No subsidy for losers: For each R ∈ Rn and each i ∈ N , if Ai (R) = ∅, ti (R) ≥ 0.
3 Unit-demand model and rich domains
In ourmodel, potentially each agent can receive several objects.However, someauthors
study a model in which no agent can receive more than one object owing to some
reason, say by regulations, or by physical reasons.10 We call this model the unit-
demand model, and refer to our model as the multi-demand model. Some important
results are established in the unit-demandmodel, and they are related to ourmain result.
Some of such results continue to hold in themulti-demandmodel when preferences are
unit-demand, and others continue to hold only when domains include enough variety
of unit-demand preferences. In this section, we introduce “richness” of domains in our
model, which guarantees that a domain of the multi-demand model includes enough
variety of unit-demand preferences.
In the unit-demand model, preferences are defined over M ∪ {0} × R, where 0
means not receiving any object in M and is called null object. To distinguish classes
of preferences in the multi-demand model and those in the unit-demand model, we
denote a typical class of preferences in the unit-demand model by R.
Money monotonicity, first object monotonicity, possibility of compensation, and
continuity are defined in the unit-demand model in the same manner as defined in our
model. Thus, in the unit-demand model, classical preferences are defined in the same
manner.
Definition 5 Apreference relation Ri overM∪{0}×R is classical if it satisfiesmoney
monotonicity, first object monotonicity, possibility of compensation, and continuity.
Let RC be the class of classical preferences in the unit-demand model.
In the unit-demand model, a feasible allocation is an n-tuple z = ((xi , ti ))i∈N ∈
(M ∪ {0} × R)n such that for each pair i, j ∈ N , xi = x j implies xi = x j = 0. As
we mentioned, in the unit-demand model, no agent can receive more than one object.
Other notions such as rules, properties of rules, etc., are defined in the same manner
as defined in the multi-demand model.
To define the richness, we introduce the following notions, which connect prefer-
ences in the multi-demand model to those in the unit-demand model.
Definition 6 Apreference relation Ri in themulti-demandmodel induces a preference
relation R′i over M ∪ {0} × R if for each pair (a, ti ), (b, t ′i ) ∈ M ∪ {0} × R, (a, ti ) R′i
(b, t ′i ) if and only if (Ai , ti ) Ri (A′i , t ′i ), where
Ai =
{
{a} if a ∈ M,




{b} if b ∈ M,
∅ if b = 0.
10 For example, Alkan and Gale (1990), Demange and Gale (1985), etc.
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Definition 7 A class of preferences R in the multi-demand model induces a class of
preferences R over M ∪ {0} × R if (i) for each R′i ∈ R, there is Ri ∈ R that induces
R′i , and (ii) for each Ri ∈ R, there is R′i ∈ R that is induced by Ri .
Remark 3 Each of RU , RU+ , and RU\RU+ induces RC .
Now, we introduce the richness of domain, which guarantees that a domain of the
multi-demand model includes enough variety of unit-demand preferences so that they
induce the class of classical preferences in the unit-demand model.
Definition 8 A class of preferences R is rich if R ∩ RU induces RC .
By Remark 3, RU , RU+ , and RU\RU+ are rich.
4 Minimum price Walrasian rules
In this section we define the minimum price Walrasian rules and state several facts
related to them.
Let p ≡ (p1, . . . , pM ) ∈ Rm+ be a price vector. The budget set at p is defined as
B(p) ≡ {(Ai , ti ) ∈ M × R : ti = ∑a∈Ai pa}. Given Ri ∈ R, the demand set at p
for Ri is defined as D(Ri , p) ≡ {zi ∈ B(p) : for each z′i ∈ B(p), zi Ri z′i }.
Lemma 2 Let Ri ∈ RU and p ∈ Rm+. (i) Suppose p ∈ Rm++. Then, for each (Ai , ti ) ∈
D(Ri , p), |Ai | ≤ 1. (ii) Let Ai ∈ M be such that (Ai ,∑a∈Ai pa) Ri (A′i ,∑a∈A′i pa)
for each A′i ∈ M with |A′i | ≤ 1. Then, (Ai ,
∑
a∈Ai p
a) ∈ D(Ri , p).
Definition 9 Let R ∈ Rn . A pair ((A, t), p) ∈ Z × Rm+ is a Walrasian equilibrium
(WE) for R if
W-i: for each i ∈ N , (Ai , ti ) ∈ D(Ri , p), and
W-ii: for each a ∈ M, if a /∈ Ai for each i ∈ N , then, pa = 0.
Condition W-i says that each agent receives a bundle that he demands. Condition
W-ii says that an object’s price is zero if it is not assigned to anyone. Given R ∈ Rn ,
let W (R) and P(R) be the sets of Walrasian equilibria and prices for R, respectively.
Lemma 3 Let R ∈ (RU )n and p ∈ P(R). (i) If n > m, then pa > 0 for each a ∈ M.
(ii) There is ((A, t), p) ∈ W (R) such that |Ai | ≤ 1 for each i ∈ N.
Let R ∈ (RU )n and R′ be preference profiles of themulti-demand and unit-demand
models respectively such that for each i ∈ N , R′i is induced by Ri . For each p ∈ P(R),
by (ii) of Lemma 3, there is an allocation (({ai }, ti ))i∈N such that ((({ai }, ti ))i∈N , p) ∈
W (R), and thus, (((ai , ti ))i∈N , p) is aWE for R′. On the other hand, for each p ∈ RM+ ,
if p is a WE price vector for R′, then there is an allocation ((ai , ti ))i∈N such that
(((ai , ti ))i∈N , p) is a WE for R′, and thus by (ii) of Lemma 2, ((({ai }, ti ))i∈N , p) ∈
W (R). Therefore, the set ofWE price vectors for R coincides with the set of WE price
vectors for R′.
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In the unit-demand model, several results onWalrasian equilibrium are established.
By the preceding argument, the same results continue to hold in our model for prefer-
ences satisfying the unit-demand property.
Fact 1 (Alkan and Gale 1990) 11, 12 For each R ∈ (RU )n, a Walrasian equilibrium
for R exists.
Fact 2 (Demange and Gale 1985) For each R ∈ (RU )n, there is a unique minimum
Walrasian equilibrium price vector, i.e., a vector p ∈ P(R) such that for each p′ ∈
P(R), p ≤ p′.13
Given R ∈ Rn , a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium (MPWE) for R is a Wal-
rasian equilibrium for R whose price is minimum. Given R ∈ Rn , let pmin(R) be
the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price for R, and ZWmin(R) be the set of Walrasian
equilibrium allocations associated with pmin(R). Although there might be several
minimum price Walrasian equilibria, they are indifferent for each agent, i.e., for each
R ∈ Rn , each pair z, z′ ∈ ZWmin(R), and each i ∈ N , zi Ii z′i .
Definition 10 A rule f on Rn is a minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule if for each
R ∈ Rn , f (R) ∈ ZWmin(R).
It is easy to show that the MPW rules on (RU )n satisfy efficiency, individual
rationality, and no subsidy. Demange and Gale (1985) show that the MPW rules
are strategy-proof on the classical domain in the unit-demand model. Our arguments
above allow us to convert each MPWE allocation in the unit-demand model into an
MPWE for a unit-demand profile in the multi-demand model. Moreover, all the min-
imum price Walrasian equilibria are indifferent for each agent. Thus, the result by
Demange and Gale (1985) implies that for each rich class of preferences R ⊆ RU ,
the MPW rules on Rn also satisfy strategy-proofness in multi-demand model.
Morimoto and Serizawa (2015) shows that in the unit-demandmodel, when n > m,
only the MPW rules satisfy efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and
no subsidy for losers on (RC )n . The following lemma states that in the multi-demand
model, when n > m, efficient rules never assign more than one object to agents whose
preferences satisfy the unit-demand property.
Lemma 4 (Single object assignment) Let n > m. Let R ⊆ RC and f be an efficient
rule on Rn. Let R ∈ Rn and i ∈ N. If Ri ∈ RU , |Ai (R)| ≤ 1.
By Lemma 4, when n > m, for each R ⊆ RU that is rich, and each rule on Rn
satisfying efficiency, it always assigns each agent at most one object. Thus, when n >
m, for each R ⊆ RU that is rich, and each rule on Rn satisfying efficiency, strategy-
proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers, there is a corresponding
11 Precisely, Alkan and Gale (1990) show the non-emptiness of the core in a two-sided matching model.
However, the two-sided matching model includes the unit-demand model, and in the unit-demand model,
non-emptiness of the core is equivalent to the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium.
12 Fact 1 is also shown by other authors. See, for example, Quinzii (1984), Gale (1984).
13 For each p, p′ ∈ Rm , p ≤ p′ if and only if for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, pi ≤ p′i .
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rule in the unit-demand model, and moreover, it is easy to see that the corresponding
rule also satisfies the four properties. Thus, the result by Morimoto and Serizawa
(2015) continues to hold in our model.
Fact 3 (Demange and Gale 1985 for (i); Morimoto and Serizawa 2015 for (ii)) Let
R ⊆ RU . (i) The minimum price Walrasian rules on Rn satisfy efficiency, strategy-
proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy. (ii) Let n > m, and R be rich. Then,
the minimum price Walrasian rules are the only rules on Rn satisfying efficiency,
strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for losers.
5 Main result
In this section, first we state the main theorem. Next, we explain how we prove the
theorem.
5.1 Impossibility result
We consider rich domains containing some multi-demand preferences and we investi-
gate whether efficient and strategy-proof rules still exist on such domains. In marked
contrast to Fact 3 in Sect. 3, the results are negative. Namely, if there are more agents
than objects, and if the domain is rich and contains even a single multi-demand pref-
erence relation, then no rule on the domain satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness,
individual rationality and no subsidy for losers.
Theorem Let n > m. Let R0 ∈ RM and R be a rich class of preferences such
that R0 ∈ R. Then, no rule on Rn satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual
rationality and no subsidy for losers.
Corollary 1 Let n > m. Let R = RU ∪RM. Then, no rule on Rn satisfies efficiency,
strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for losers.
Remark 4 The Corollary 1 is a standard form of impossibility results on strategy-
proofness in that since Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), many impossibility
results on strategy-proofness of this form are established. In such results, a domain is
fixed and incompatibility of some properties of rules is established on this domain.
Results of this form cannot be applied unless all the preferences in the fixed domain
are deemed plausible. For example, the Corollary 1 cannot be applied unless all the
preferences in RM in addition to RU are deemed plausible. On the other hand, our
Theorem can be applied as soon as in addition to a rich class of preferencesR, just one
preference relation R0 arbitrarily chosen from RM is deemed plausible. Accordingly
our Theorem can be applied to more variety of environments than Corollary 1. For
example, consider an environment where n = 40 , m = 20 and there are only the
preferences satisfying k-object-demand property for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The Theorem
can be applied to this environment, but the Corollary 1 cannot be.
By Remark 3, we also have the following corollaries. These corollaries demonstrate
the wide applicability of our results even more. In this paper, we do not maintain free
123
644 T. Kazumura, S. Serizawa
disposal. However, it is a standard assumption for preferences. Corollary 2 states that
our conclusion holds even if free disposal is assumed.
Corollary 2 Let n > m. Let R0 ∈ RM and R ≡ RU+ ∪ {R0}. Then, no rule on Rn
satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for losers.
Free disposal is not a suitable assumption in some environment. Corollary 3 states
that our conclusion holds even in such an environment.
Corollary 3 Let n > m. Let R0 ∈ RM and R ≡ (RU\RU+) ∪ {R0}. Then, no rule on
Rn satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for
losers.
Remark 5 In this paper, we assume that preferences are drawn from a common class
of R. If preferences of each agent are drawn from a class Ri that depends on the
identity of the agent, our theorem can be strengthened as follows: Suppose that, for
each i ∈ N , Ri is rich, and there are j ∈ N and R j ∈ RM such that R j ∈ R j . Then,
when n > m, no rule on
∏
i∈N Ri satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual
rationality and no subsidy for losers.
5.2 Sketch of the proof
5.2.1 Preliminary results
We state seven lemmas which we use in the sketch of the proof and in the formal
proof. The proof of each lemma is relegated to the Appendix, or is omitted if it is
straightforward.
LetR ⊆ RC be rich. Let f be a rule onRn satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness,
individual rationality and no subsidy for losers. Lemma5 states that if an agent receives
no object, then his payment is zero. This is immediate from individual rationality and
no subsidy for losers. Thus we omit the proof.
Lemma 5 (Zero payment for losers) Let R ∈ Rn and i ∈ N. If Ai (R) = ∅, ti (R) = 0.
Lemma 6 states that for each agent, his payment is at most the valuation, at 0, of
the set of objects that he receives. This is immediate from individual rationality. Thus,
we omit the proof.
Lemma 6 For each R ∈ Rn and each i ∈ N, ti (R) ≤ Vi (Ai (R); 0).
Lemma 7 states that each object is assigned to some agent. This follows from
efficiency, n > m, and first object monotonicity. We omit the proof.
Lemma 7 (Full object assignment) Let n > m. For each R ∈ Rn and each a ∈ M,
there is i ∈ N such that a ∈ Ai (R).
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Lemma 8 states a necessary condition for efficiency.
Lemma 8 (Necessary condition for efficiency) Let R ∈ Rn and i, j ∈ N with i = j .
Let Ai , A j ∈ M be such that Ai ∩ A j = ∅ and Ai ∪ A j ⊆ Ai (R) ∪ A j (R). Then,
Vi (Ai ; fi (R)) + Vj (A j ; f j (R)) ≤ ti (R) + t j (R).
Although no subsidy for losers itself tells us nothing about payment levels for non-
empty sets of objects, Lemma 9 states that for each non-empty set of objects, there is
a lower bound of the payment level for the set.
Lemma 9 (Payment lower bound) Let n > m. Let R ∈ Rn and i ∈ N. Let
R′i ∈ R ∩ RU be such that for each a ∈ M and each ti ∈ R, V ′i (a; (∅, ti )) − ti <
min j∈N\{i} Vj (a; 0).14 Then, ti (R) ≥ V ′i (Ai (R); 0).
By first object monotonicity, Lemma 9 implies that for each R ∈ Rn and each
i ∈ N , if |Ai (R)| = 1, then ti (R) ≥ 0.
Lemma 10 states that f coincides with an MPW rule on (R ∩ RU )n . This is
immediate from (ii) of Fact 3. Thus we omit the proof.
Lemma 10 Let n > m. For each R ∈ (R ∩ RU )n, f (R) ∈ ZWmin(R).
Given i ∈ N and R−i ∈ Rn−1, we define the option set of agent i for R−i by
oi (R−i ) ≡ {zi ∈ M × R : ∃Ri ∈ R s.t. fi (Ri , R−i ) = zi }.
Lemma 11 states that (i) the option set does not contain more than one bundle with
the same set of objects, and (ii) each agent receives one of the most preferred bundles
in his option set. This is straightforward from strategy-proofness. Thus, we omit the
proof.
Lemma 11 Let i ∈ N and R−i ∈ Rn. (i) For each pair (Ai , ti ), (A′i , t ′i ) ∈ oi (R−i ), if
Ai = A′i , then ti = t ′i . (ii) For each Ri ∈ R and each zi ∈ oi (R−i ), fi (Ri , R−i ) Ri zi .
5.2.2 Three-agent and two-object example
Since the proof of the Theorem is very complicated, we relegate it to the Appendix.
Here we demonstrate the ideas and techniques of the proof by applying them to a
particular example in a three-agent and two-object setting. Let M = {a, b} and N =
{1, 2, 3}. In the formal proof, the preference relation R0 is an arbitrary element ofRM ,
but here we pick R0 from RQ ∩ RM . For concreteness, let
v0(a) = 20, v0(b) = 18 and v0({a, b}) = 40.
However, the idea of our proof does not depend on R0 ∈ RQ . We assume R0 ∈ RQ
only for simplicity of expression.
14 Notice that in each class of preferences satisfying the richness, there exists such a preference relation.
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LetR ⊆ RC satisfy the richness and contain R0. For example, letR ⊇ RU ∪{R0}.
We suppose that there is a rule f on R3 satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness,
individual rationality and no subsidy for losers, and derive a contradiction.
Step A: Constructing a preference profile.
Let R1 = R0. We construct R2 ∈ RU and R3 ∈ RU depending on R1 so that a
contradiction is derived. We define R2 satisfying V2(a; 0) > v1({a, b}) and 15
V2(b; 0) − V2(∅; (b, 0)) < min{v1({a, b}) − v1(a), v1({a, b}) − v1(b)}.




41 if A2 = {a},
12 if A2 = {b},




9 if A2 = {a},
10 if A2 = {b},




−1 if A2 = {a},
9 if A2 = {b},




−2 if A2 = {a},
0 if A2 = {b},
0 if A2 = {a, b}.
We define R3 satisfying R3 ∈ RU ∩ RQ , and
v3(a) = v3(b) < 3
5
min{v1({a, b}) − v1(a), v1({a, b}) − v1(b)}.
For example, let v3(a) = v3(b) = 9. Note that V2(a; 0) > v3({a, b}). Let R ≡
(R1, R2, R3). Figure 4 illustrates R. unionsq
Step B: A2(R) = ∅.
Suppose by contradiction that A2(R) = ∅. By Lemma 5, f2(R) = 0. By Lemma 7,
there is i = 2 such that a ∈ Ai (R).
Let Ai = ∅ and A2 = {a}. Note that Ai ∩ A2 = ∅ and Ai ∪ A2 ⊆ Ai (R) ∪ A2(R).
If i = 1, then V1(∅; f1(R)) ≥ t1(R) − 40. If i = 3, then V3(∅; f3(R)) = t3(R) − 9.
Thus, Vi (∅; fi (R)) ≥ ti (R) − 40. Since V2(a; 0) = 41,
15 In this sketch, we assume that M = {a, b} and R0 ∈ RQ for the simplicity of expression. For a general
multi-demand preference relation R0, theRHSof the first inequality is set as themaximal difference between
various t1 in [0, V1({a, b}; 0)] and the valuation of empty set at ({a, b}, t1) for R1, i.e.,
max
t1∈[0,V1({a,b};0)]
{t1 − V1(∅; ({a, b}, t1))}.
For a general set M , the RHS is defined as t1 in the Appendix.
For a generalmulti-demand preference relation R0, theRHSof the second inequality is set as theminimum





{V1({a, b}; (a, t1)) − t1}, min
t1∈[0,V1({b};0)]
{V1({a, b}; (b, t1)) − t1}
}
.
For a general set M of objects, the RHS of the second inequality is defined as t1 in the Appendix.
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Fig. 4 R = (R1, R2, R3)
Vi (Ai ; fi (R)) + V2(A2; f2(R)) = Vi (∅; fi (R)) + V2(a; 0) (by f2(R) = 0)
≥ ti (R) − 40 + 41
> ti (R) + t2(R). (by t2(R) = 0)
Thus, by Lemma 8, efficiency is violated, a contradiction. unionsq
Step C: A1(R) = a.
Substep C-1: (a, 9) ∈ o1(R−1).
Let R′1 ∈ RU be such that
V ′1(a; 0) > max{V2(a; 0), V3(a; 0)} and V ′1(b; 0) < min{V2(b; 0), V3(b; 0)}.
For example, let R′1 ∈ RU be such that
V ′1(a; 0) = 50, V ′1(b; 0) = 1 and V ′1({a, b}; 0) = 50.
Since (R′1, R−1) ∈ (RU )3, by Lemma 10, f (R′1, R−1) ∈ ZWmin(R′1, R−1). Let z ∈ Z
be such that
z1 = (a, 9), z2 = (b, 9) and z3 = 0.
Figure 5 illustrates (R′1, R−1) and z.
Let p ≡ (9, 9). Then, D(R′1, p) = {{a}}, D(R2, p) = {{b}}, and D(R3, p) ={∅, {a}, {b}}. Thus (z, p) ∈ W (R′1, R−1), implying pmin(R′1, R−1) ≤ p. If
pamin(R
′
1, R−1) < 9 or pbmin(R′1, R−1) < 9, then 0 /∈ D(R′1, pmin(R′1, R−1)) and
for each i ∈ {2, 3}, 0 /∈ D(Ri , pmin(R′1, R−1)), which implies pmin(R′1, R−1) /∈
P(R′1, R−1), a contradiction. Thus, pmin(R′1, R−1) = (9, 9). Moreover, z is the only
WE allocation supported by pmin(R′1, R−1). Thus, f1(R′1, R−1) = z, and hence,
f1(R′1, R−1) = (a, 9) ∈ o1(R−1).
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Fig. 6 (R′′1 , R−1) and z′ in Step C
Substep C-2: (b, 10) ∈ o1(R−1).
Let R′′1 ∈ RU be such that
V ′′1 (b; 0) > max{V2(b; 0), V3(b; 0)} and V ′′1 (a; 0) < min{V2(a; 0), V3(a; 0)}.
For example, let R′′1 ∈ RU be such that
V ′′1 (a; 0) = 1, V ′′1 (b; 0) = 50 and V ′′1 ({a, b}; 0) = 50.
Since (R′′1 , R−1) ∈ (RU )3, by Lemma 10, f (R′′1 , R−1) ∈ ZWmin(R′′1 , R−1). Let z′ ∈ Z
be such that
z′1 = (b, 10), z′2 = (a, 9), and z′3 = 0.
Figure 6 illustrates (R′′1 , R−1) and z′.
Let p′ ≡ (9, 10). Then, D(R′′1 , p′) = {{b}}, D(R2, p′) = {{a}, {b}}, and
D(R3, p′) = {∅, {a}}. Thus (z′, p′) ∈ W (R′′1 , R−1), implying pmin(R′′1 , R−1) ≤ p′.
If pamin(R
′′
1 , R−1) < 9, then 0 /∈ D(R′′1 , pmin(R′′1 , R−1)) and for each i ∈ {2, 3},
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Fig. 7 z in Step D
0 /∈ D(Ri , pmin(R′′1 , R−1)), which implies pmin(R′′1 , R−1) /∈ P(R′′1 , R−1), a con-
tradiction. Thus, pamin(R
′′
1 , R−1) = 9. If pbmin(R′′1 , R−1) < 10, then we have
D(R′′1 , pmin(R′′1 , R−1)) = {{b}} and D(R2, pmin(R′′1 , R−1)) = {{b}}, which fur-
ther implies pmin(R′′1 , R−1) /∈ P(R′′1 , R−1), a contradiction. Thus, pmin(R′′1 , R−1) =
(9, 10). Moreover, z′ is the only WE allocation which is supported by pmin(R′′1 , R−1).
Thus, f (R′′1 , R−1) = z′, and hence, f1(R′′1 , R−1) = (b, 10) ∈ o1(R−1).
Substep C-3: A1(R) = a.
Since A2(R) = ∅ by Step B, |A1(R)| ≤ 1. If A1(R) = ∅, then by Lemma 5,
we have f1(R) = 0, and thus, f1(R′1, R−1) P1 f1(R), which contradicts strategy-
proofness. Thus, A1(R) = a or b, and therefore, by (i) of Lemma 11, f1(R) = (a, 9)
or (b, 10). Since (a, 9) P1 (b, 10), (ii) of Lemma 11 implies f1(R) = (a, 9). unionsq
Step D: f (R) is not efficient for R.
By A2(R) = ∅ and A1(R) = a, A2(R) = b. By Lemma 6, t2(R) ≤ V2(b; 0) = 12.
By Lemma 9, t2(R) ≥ 0.
Let z ≡ ((Ai , ti ))i∈N ∈ Z be such that
z1 = ({a, b}, 29), z2 = (∅,−3), and z3 = f3(R).
Figure 7 illustrates z.
Since V1({a, b}; f1(R)) = V1({a, b}; (a, 9)) = 29, it is easy to see that z1 I1 f1(R)
and z3 I3 f3(R). Also by t2(R) ≥ 0 and A2(R) = b, z2 = (∅,−3) I2 (b, 0) R2
f2(R). Moreover, by t1(R) = 9 and t2(R) ≤ 12,∑
i∈N




implying that f (R) is not efficient for R, a contradiction. unionsq
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We emphasize the difference between a (direct) proof of the Corollary 1 that one
mightwrite, and the proof of the Theorem thatwe have shown. To prove theCorollary 1
directly, we can freely pick preference profiles in RU ∪RM to derive a contradiction.
On the other hand, in the proof of the Theorem, we may only choose preferences from
RU ∪ {R0}. Moreover, the preference relation R0, which could be anything in RM ,
forces us to construct profiles depending on R0, further complicating the process.
In the above sketch, R0 ∈ RM is assumed to be quasi-linear, but the basic logic of
the sketch works even in the case R0 ∈ RM\RQ .
In the formal proof in the Appendix, we have six steps. Steps A, B, C, and D
correspond to Steps 1, 3, 4, and 6, respectively, of the formal proof. Steps 2 and 5 of
the formal proof are necessary only for the more general case, so they do not appear
in the above sketch.
6 Concluding remarks
In this article, we have considered an object assignment problem with money where
each agent can receive more than one object. We focused on domains that contain
enough variety of unit-demand preferences and some multi-demand preferences. We
studied allocation rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality,
and no subsidy for losers, and showed that if the domain contains enough variety of
unit-demandpreferences and at least onemulti-demandpreference relation, and if there
are more agents than objects, then no rule satisfies the four properties. As discussed
in Sect. 1, we have been motivated by the search for efficient and strategy-proof rules
on a domain which is not quasi-linear or unit-demand. Our result establishes the
difficulty of designing efficient and strategy-proof rules on such a domain. We state
three remarks on our result.
Maximal domain. Some literature on strategy-proofness investigates the existence of
maximal domains on which there are rules satisfying desirable properties.16 A domain
Rn is amaximal domain for a list of properties of rules if there is a rule onRn satisfying
the properties, and for each R′  R, no rule on (R′)n satisfies the properties. Our
result is rather closer to maximal domain results than impossibility results of the form
of the Corollary 1. However, our result does not imply that the unit-demand domain
is a maximal domain for the four properties in the Theorem, since we add only multi-
demandpreferences to the rich domains and derive the non-existence of rules satisfying
the four properties. In fact, what domains including (RU )n are maximal domains for
the four properties is an open question.
However, we are sure that (RU )n is not a maximal domain for the four properties.
For example, consider Ri in Example 3 and let R ≡ RU ∪ {Ri }. Since Ri does
not satisfy the unit-demand property, R  RU . Note that for each R j ∈ R, each
A j ∈ M with |A j | > 1 and each t j ∈ R, if t j ≥ 0, then there is a ∈ A j such that
(a, t j ) I j (A j , t j ). Thus, since each agent never pays negative amount of money under
the minimum price Walrasian rules, and since they satisfy the four properties on the
16 For example, see Ching and Serizawa (1998), Berga and Serizawa (2000), Massó and Neme (2001),
Ehlers (2002), etc.
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unit-demand domain, they also satisfy the four properties on Rn . Hence, (RU )n is not
a maximal domain for the four properties.
Althoughwe do not findmaximal domains for the four properties, themulti-demand
class includes most of natural preferences outside the unit-demand class. Thus, our
result implies that on most of natural domains properly including the unit-demand
domain, if there are more agents than objects, we have an impossibility of designing
rules satisfying the four properties.
Other properties. Efficiency is not the only property studied in the literature on auc-
tion theory. For example, some authors study strategy-proof and individually rational
rules that achieve as much revenue as possible. Since efficiency takes the auctioneer’s
revenue into account, efficiency is closely related to maximizing the auctioneer’s rev-
enue. However, there may exist strategy-proof and individually rational rules that is
not efficient but achieve as much revenue as possible.17
While efficiency takes the auctioneer’s revenue into account, some authors study
another efficiency notion that takes only agents’ preferences into account.18 An allo-
cation is efficient with no deficit if (i) the sum of payments is nonnegative, and (ii) no
other allocation with nonnegative sum of payments makes each agent at least as well
off and at least one agent better off. Notice that efficiency is implied by efficiency with
no deficit.19 Thus, the Theorem holds even if we replace efficiency by efficiency with
no deficit.
Identical objects. Some literature on object assignment problems also study the case
in which the objects are identical.20 In this paper, we do not make this assumption.
When objects are not identical, the domain includes a greater variety of preference
profiles than when objects are identical. This variety plays an important role in our
proof. Therefore, our theorem does not exclude the possibility that when objects are
identical, multi-demand preferences can be added to the unit-demand domain without
preventing the existence of rules satisfying the four properties.
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Appendix: Proofs
A Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1: First, we define Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti )) for each ti ∈ R. Take any ti ∈ R.
Let B ≡ {t ′i ∈ R : (A′i , t ′i ) Ri (Ai , ti )} and W ≡ {t ′i ∈ R : (Ai , ti ) Ri (A′i , t ′i )}. By
possibility of compensation, B = ∅ and W = ∅. By continuity, B and W are both
closed. By money monotonicity, B is bounded above and W is bounded below. Thus,
t i ≡ max B and t i ≡ minW exist.
Suppose t i > t i . Then, by money monotonicity, (A
′
i , t i ) Pi (A
′
i , t i ) Ri (Ai , ti ).
This implies t i /∈ W . This contradicts t i = minW . Thus, t i ≤ t i .
Suppose t i < t i . Let t
′
i ∈ (t i , t i ). By t ′i < t i , t ′i /∈ W , that is, (Ai , ti ) Ri (A′i , t ′i )
does not hold. By t ′i > t i , t ′i /∈ B, that is, (A′i , t ′i ) Ri (Ai , ti ) does not hold. This
contradicts completeness. Thus, t i = t i .
Let Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti )) ≡ t i = t i . Then, B ∩ W = {Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti ))} and so
(A′i , Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti ))) Ri (Ai , ti ) and (Ai , ti ) Ri (A′i , Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti ))),which implies
(A′i , Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti ))) Ii zi . Since B∩W is a singleton, such Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ti )) is unique.
Finally, we show that the function Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ·)) is continuous. Note that it is
sufficient to show that for each si ∈ R, the function’s inverse images of (−∞, si ]
and [si ,+∞) are both closed.21 Take any si ∈ R. Let ti ≡ Vi (Ai ; (A′i , si )).
Then, by money monotonicity and continuity of Ri , the inverse images of (−∞, si ]
and [si ,+∞) are (−∞, ti ] and [ti ,+∞) respectively, which are closed. Thus,
Vi (A′i ; (Ai , ·)) is continuous. unionsq
Proof of (i) of Lemma 2: Suppose that there is (Ai , ti ) ∈ D(Ri , p) such that |Ai | > 1.
By Ri ∈ RU , there is a ∈ Ai such that (a, ti ) Ri (Ai , ti ). By (Ai , ti ) ∈ B(p),
ti = ∑b∈Ai pb. By p ∈ Rm++ and |Ai | > 1, pa < ∑b∈Ai pb = ti . Thus, by first
object monotonicity,
(a, pa) Pi (a, ti ) Ri (Ai , ti ),
which contradicts (Ai , ti ) ∈ D(Ri , p). unionsq




a) Ri (A′i ,
∑
a∈A′i p
a). Suppose |A′i | > 1. By Ri ∈ RU , there is a ∈ A′i
21 See Debreu (1959).
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b) Ri (Ai ,
∑
b∈A′i p
b). By p ∈ Rm+ and money monotonicity,
(a, pa) Ri (a,
∑
b∈A′i p
b) Ri (A′i ,
∑
b∈A′i p















b) ∈ D(Ri , p). unionsq
Proof of (i) of Lemma 3: By contradiction, suppose that n > m and pa = 0 for some
a ∈ M . Then, by first object monotonicity, for each i ∈ N , (a, pa) Pi 0. Thus, for
each i ∈ N , 0 /∈ D(Ri , p), which implies that for each ((A, t), p) ∈ W (R), Ai = ∅.
However, this contradicts n > m. unionsq
Proof of (ii) of Lemma 3: By p ∈ P(R), there is (A, t) ∈ Z such that ((A, t), p) ∈
W (R).
Let N∗ = {i ∈ N : |Ai | > 1} and i ∈ N∗. By Ri ∈ RU , there is a ∈ Ai such
that (a, ti ) Ri (Ai , ti ). By (Ai , ti ) ∈ B(p), ti = ∑b∈Ai pb. By p ∈ Rm+, pa ≤∑
b∈Ai p
b = ti . Thus, by money monotonicity, (a, pa) Ri (a, ti ) Ri (Ai , ti ), which
implies (a, pa) ∈ D(Ri , p) and pb = 0 for each b ∈ Ai {a}. Hence, for each i ∈ N∗,
there is ai ∈ Ai such that (ai , pai ) ∈ D(Ri , p) and pb = 0 for each b ∈ Ai\{ai }.
Let z′ ∈ Z be such that for each i ∈ N∗, z′i = (ai , pai ), and for each i ∈ N\N∗,
z′i = (Ai , ti ). Then, each agent receives at most one object at z′, and clearly,
(z′, p) ∈ W (R). unionsq
Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose by contradiction that Ri ∈ RU and |Ai (R)| > 1. Then,
there is a ∈ Ai (R) such that (a, ti (R)) Ri fi (R). By |Ai (R)| > 1, there is b ∈ Ai (R)
such that b = a.
By n > m, there is j ∈ N\{i} such that A j (R) = ∅. Let z ≡ ((Ak, tk))k∈N ∈ Z be
such that
zi = (a, ti (R)),
z j = (b, t j (R)), and





k∈N tk(R), and for each k ∈ N\{i, j}, zk Ik fk(R). Moreover,
zi = (a, ti (R)) Ri fi (R), and by first object monotonicity, z j = (b, t j (R)) Pj f j (R).
This contradicts efficiency. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 8: Suppose by contradiction that Vi (Ai ; fi (R))+ Vj (A j ; f j (R)) >
ti (R) + t j (R). Let z′ ∈ Z be such that z′i = (Ai , Vi (Ai ; fi (R))), z′j =
(A j , Vj (A j ; f j (R))), and for each k ∈ N\{i, j}, z′k = fk(R). Then z′k Ik fk(R)
for each k ∈ N . Moreover, Vi (Ai ; fi (R)) + Vj (A j ; f j (R)) + ∑k =i, j tk(R) >∑
k∈N tk(R). By Remark 2, this contradicts efficiency. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 9: (Fig. 8) Suppose by contradiction that ti (R) < V ′i (Ai (R); 0). If
Ai (R) = ∅, then ti (R) < V ′i (∅; 0) = 0, which contradicts no subsidy for losers.
Hence, Ai (R) = ∅.
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ti(Ri, R−i) − Vi(∅; fi(Ri, R−i))
Fig. 8 Illustration of proof of Lemma 9
Next, we show Ai (R′i , R−i ) = ∅. Suppose not. Then, by Lemma 5, fi (R′i , R−i ) =
0. By ti (R) < V ′i (Ai (R); 0), fi (R) P ′i 0 = fi (R′i , R−i ), which contradicts strategy-
proofness. Hence Ai (R′i , R−i ) = ∅.
By R′i ∈ RU , Ai (R′i , R−i ) = ∅, and Lemma 4, there is a ∈ M such that
Ai (R′i , R−i ) = a. Since n > m and Ai (R′i , R−i ) = ∅, there is j ∈ N\{i}
such that A j (R′i , R−i ) = ∅. By Lemma 5, f j (R′i , R−i ) = 0. Thus, letting si ≡
V ′i (∅; fi (R′i , R−i )),
V ′i (∅; fi (R′i , R−i )) + Vj (a; f j (R′i , R−i ))
= si + Vj (a; 0) (by si = V ′i (∅; fi (R′i , R−i )) and f j (R′i , R−i ) = 0)
= ti (R′i , R−i ) − (ti (R′i , R−i ) − si ) + Vj (a; 0)
= ti (R′i , R−i ) − (V ′i (a; (∅, si )) − si ) + Vj (a; 0)
(by V ′i (a; (∅, si )) = ti (R′i , R−i ))
> ti (R
′
i , R−i ) (by V ′i (a; (∅, si )) − si < Vj (a; 0))
= ti (R′i , R−i ) + t j (R′i , R−i ). (by t j (R′i , R−i ) = 0)
This contradicts Lemma 8. unionsq
B Proof of Theorem
The proof of the Theorem has six steps.
Step 1: Constructing preferences.
Let R1 ≡ R0. For each a ∈ M , let Ma ≡ {A1 ∈ M : a ∈ A1}.
Claim 1: There is t1 ∈ R such that t1 > 0 and
t1 = mina∈M mint1∈[0,V1({a};0)] maxA1∈Ma{V1(A1; (a, t1)) − t1}.
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Proof. For each a ∈ M , let ga be a function on Ma × R such that for each A1 ∈ Ma
and each t1 ∈ R, ga(A1, t1) = V1(A1; (a, t1)) − t1, and let gamax be a function on R
such that for each t1 ∈ R, gamax(t1) = maxA1∈Ma ga(A1, t1).
Note that by Lemma 1, for each a ∈ M , and each A1 ∈ Ma , ga(A1, ·) is continuous
in R. Thus, Berge’s maximum theorem implies that for each a ∈ M , gamax(·) is also
continuous in R.22 For each a ∈ M , since [0, V1(a; 0)] is compact, there is tˆ a1 ∈[0, V1(a; 0)] such that gamax(tˆ a1 ) = mint1∈[0,V1(a;0)] gamax(t1). For each a ∈ M , let
ta1 ≡ gamax(tˆ a1 ). Since M is finite, min{ta1 : a ∈ M} exists. Let t1 ≡ min{ta1 : a ∈ M}.
Then,
t1 = mina∈M mint1∈[0,V1(a;0)] maxA1∈Ma{V1(A1; (a, t1)) − t1}.
Next, we show t1 > 0. Let a ∈ M be such that t1 = maxA1∈Ma {V1(A1; (a, tˆ a1 ))−
tˆ a1 }. By R1 ∈ RM , there is Aˆ1 ∈ Ma such that ( Aˆ1, tˆ a1 ) P1 (a, tˆ a1 ), that is,
V1( Aˆ1; (a, tˆ a1 )) − tˆ a1 > 0. Thus,
t1 = max
A1∈Ma
{V1(A1; (a, tˆ a1 )) − tˆ a1 } ≥ V1( Aˆ1; (a, tˆ a1 )) − tˆ a1 > 0.
unionsq
By Claim 1, there is d∗ ∈ R++ such that 5(m − 1)d∗ < t1 and for each a ∈ M ,
(a, 3d∗) P1 0. Let a∗ ∈ M be such that for each a ∈ M\{a∗}, (a∗, 3d∗) R1 (a, 3d∗).
Without loss of generality, assume a∗ = 1.
Since R is rich, there is R′1 ∈ R ∩ RU such that for each a ∈ M and each t1 ∈ R,








M(R1, s∗1 ) ≡ {A1 ∈ M\{∅} : V1(A1; 0) ≥ s∗1 }.
Note that by first object monotonicity, M(R1, s∗1 ) = ∅.





{t1 − V1(∅; (A1, t1))}.
Proof. For each A1 ∈ M(R1, s∗1 ), let gA1 be a function onR such that for each t1 ∈ R,
gA1(t1) = t1 − V1(∅; (A1, t1)). Note that by Lemma 1, for each A1 ∈ M(R1, s∗1 ),
gA1 is continuous in R. For each A1 ∈ M(R1, s∗1 ), since [s∗1 , V1(A1; 0)] is compact,
there is tˆ A11 ∈ [s∗1 , V1(A1; 0)] such that gA1(tˆ A11 ) = maxt1∈[s∗1 ,V1(A1;0)] gA1(t1). For
each A1 ∈ M(R1, s∗1 ), let t A1 = gA1(tˆ A11 ). SinceM(R1, s∗1 ) is finite, max{t A1 : A1 ∈
M(R1, s∗1 )} exists. Let t1 ≡ max{t A1 : A1 ∈ M(R1, s∗1 )}. Then,
22 See Berge (1963).
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{t1 − V1(∅; (A1, t1))}.
Next, we show t1 ≥ t1. Let a ∈ M , t1 ∈ [0, V1(a; 0)] and A1 ∈ Ma be such
that t1 = V1(A1; (a, t1)) − t1. Let tˆ1 ≡ V1(A1; (a, t1)). Since V1(∅; (A1, tˆ1)) =
V1(∅; (a, t1)) and since first object monotonicity implies t1 − V1(∅; (a, t1)) > 0,
tˆ1 − V1(∅; (A1, tˆ1)) = V1(A1; (a, t1)) − t1 + t1 − V1(∅; (a, t1))
> V1(A1; (a, t1)) − t1.
By t1 ≤ V1(a; 0), tˆ1 ≤ V1(A1; 0). By t1 ≥ 0, t1 > 0, and s∗1 ≤ 0, tˆ1 = t1 + t1 >





{t ′1 − V1(∅; (A′1, t ′1))}
≥ tˆ1 − V1(∅; (A1, tˆ1))
≥ V1(A1; (a, t1)) − t1 = t1.
unionsq
Let d∗ ∈ R++ be such that d∗ > t1. Note that by Claim 2, 5(m − 1)d∗ < t1 ≤
t1 < d∗. Since R is rich, for each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, there is Ri ∈ R ∩ RU satisfying
the following conditions:
Vi (a; 0) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
d∗ if a = i − 1,
4d∗ if a = i,
d∗ otherwise,
(ia)
Vi (∅; (i, 0)) = −d∗, and (ib)
for each a ∈ M\{i}, Vi (a; (i, 3d∗)) < 0. (ic)
Since R is rich, for each i ∈ N\{1, . . . ,m}, there is Ri ∈ R ∩ RU such that for each
a ∈ M and each ti ∈ R,
Vi (a; (∅, ti )) = 3d∗ + ti .
Denote R ≡ (R1, . . . , Rn). Figure 9 illustrates Ri and R j , where i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} and
j ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n}.
Notice that for each a ∈ M and each t1 ∈ R,




i∈N\{1} Vi (a; 0).
Thus, by Lemma 9, t1(R) ≥ V ′1(A1(R); 0) ≥ s∗1 . 
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Fig. 9 Illustrations of Ri (i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}) and R j ( j ∈ {m + 1, . . . ,m})
Step 2: For each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, Vi (∅; fi (R)) ≥ −d∗.
Let i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. If Ai (R) = ∅, then by Lemma 5, Vi (∅; fi (R)) = ti (R) = 0 >
−d∗. Suppose Ai (R) = ∅. By Ri ∈ RU and Lemma 4, there is a ∈ M such that
Ai (R) = a. Thus, Lemma 9 implies ti (R) ≥ 0.
If a = i , then by money monotonicity, (i, 0) Ri fi (R), and thus, by ib,
Vi (∅; fi (R)) ≥ Vi (∅; (i, 0)) = −d∗. If a = i , then by ic,
Vi (a; (i, 0)) < Vi (a; (i, 3d∗)) < 0 ≤ ti (R),
which implies (i, 0) Pi fi (R), and thus, by ib Vi (∅; fi (R)) > Vi (∅; (i, 0)) = −
d∗. 
Step 3: For each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, Ai (R) = ∅.
Suppose by contradiction that there is an agent i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that Ai (R) = ∅.
By Lemma 5, ti (R) = 0. By Lemma 7, there is an agent j ∈ N\{i} such that
i − 1 ∈ A j (R). We show the following claim.
Claim 1: t j (R) − Vj (∅; f j (R)) < d∗.
Proof. We have three cases.
Case 1: j = 1. By Lemma 6 and Lemma 9, s∗1 ≤ t1(R) ≤ V1(A1(R); 0), implying
A1(R) ∈ M(R1, s∗1 ). Thus, by the def. of t1,
t1(R) − V1(∅; f1(R)) ≤ t1 < d∗.
Case 2: j ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. By R j ∈ RU and Lemma 4, A j (R) = i − 1. By Lemma 6,
t j (R) ≤ Vj (i − 1; 0). Since j − 1 = i − 1, Vj (i − 1; 0) = 4d∗ or d∗. Thus,
Vj (i − 1; 0) ≤ 4d∗. Moreover, by Step 2, Vj (∅; f j (R)) ≥ −d∗. Therefore, by 5d∗ <
5(m − 1)d∗ < d∗,
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Fig. 10 Illustration of R′′1
t j (R) − Vj (∅; f j (R)) ≤ Vj (i − 1; 0) + d∗ ≤ 5d∗ < d∗.
Case 3: j ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n}. By R j ∈ RU and Lemma 4, A j (R) = i − 1. Let
t∗j ≡ Vj (∅; f j (R)). By the def. of R j and 3d∗ < 5(m − 1)d∗ < d∗,
t j (R) − Vj (∅; f j (R)) = Vj (i − 1; (∅, t∗j )) − t∗j = 3d∗ < d∗.
unionsq
By fi (R) = 0, Vi (i − 1; fi (R)) = Vi (i − 1; 0) = d∗. Thus, by Claim 1,
Vi (i − 1; fi (R)) + Vj (∅; f j (R)) > d∗ + t j (R) − d∗ = ti (R) + t j (R).
This contradicts Lemma 8. 
Step 4: A1(R) = 1.
First we show the following claim.
Claim 1: For each a ∈ M , there is t (a) ∈ R such that (a, t (a)) ∈ o1(R−1) and
t (a)
{
≤3d∗ if a = 1,
>3d∗ otherwise.
Proof. Let a ∈ M . Since R is rich, there is R′′1 ∈ R ∩ RU such that
V ′′1 (a; 0) > maxi∈N Vi (a; 0), (1a
′′)
for each b ∈ M\{a}, V ′′1 (b; 0) < mini∈N Vi (b; 0), and (1b
′′)
for each b ∈ M\{a}, V ′′1 (b; (a, 3d∗)) < 0. (1c′′)
Figure 10 illustrates R′′1 .
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By (R′′1 , R−1) ∈ (RU )n and Lemma 10, f (R′′1 , R−1) ∈ ZWmin(R′′1 , R−1). Let
p ≡ pmin(R′′1 , R−1). By (R′′1 , R−1) ∈ (RU )n and Lemma 4, for each i ∈ N ,|Ai (R′′1 , R−1)| ≤ 1. In the following three paragraphs, we show (a, pa) ∈ o1(R−1).
First, suppose A1(R′′1 , R−1) = ∅. By Lemma 5, f1(R′′1 , R−1) = 0. By
A1(R′′1 , R−1) = ∅ and Lemma 7, there is an agent i ∈ N\{1} such that Ai (R′′1 , R−1) =
a. Since f (R′′1 , R−1) ∈ ZWmin(R′′1 , R−1), ti (R′′1 , R−1) = pa . By Lemma 6, pa =
ti (R′′i , R−i ) ≤ Vi (a; 0). Since f (R′′1 , R−1) ∈ ZWmin(R′′1 , R−1), f1(R′′1 , R−1) = 0 ∈
D(R′′1 , p), and thus, 0 R′′1 (a, pa). Therefore,
V ′′1 (a; 0) ≤ pa ≤ Vi (a; 0).
This contradicts 1a′′. Hence, A1(R′′1 , R−1) = ∅.
Next, suppose that for some b ∈ M\{a}, A1(R′′1 , R−1) = b. Since f (R′′1 , R−1) ∈
ZWmin(R
′′
1 , R−1), t1(R′′1 , R−1) = pb. By Lemma 6, pb = t1(R′′1 , R−1) ≤ V ′′1 (b; 0). By
A1(R′′1 , R−1) = ∅ and n > m, there is an agent i ∈ N\{1} such that Ai (R′′1 , R−1) = ∅.
By Lemma 5, fi (R′′1 , R−1) = 0. Since f (R′′1 , R−1) ∈ ZWmin(R′′1 , R−1), fi (R′′1 , R−1) =
0 ∈ D(Ri , p), and thus, 0 Ri (b, pb). Therefore,
Vi (b; 0) ≤ pb ≤ V ′′1 (b; 0).
This contradicts 1b′′. Thus for each b ∈ M\{a}, A1(R′′1 , R−1) = b.
By A1(R′′1 , R−1) = ∅, A1(R′′1 , R−1) = b for each b ∈ M\{a}, and|A1(R′′1 , R−1)| ≤ 1, we conclude that A1(R′′1 , R−1) = a. Since f (R′′1 , R−1) ∈
ZWmin(R
′′
1 , R−1), t1(R′′1 , R−1) = pa . Hence, (a, pa) ∈ o1(R−1).
Next, we show that pa ≤ 3d∗ if a = 1, and pa > 3d∗ otherwise.
Case 1: a = 1. Let z ∈ Z be such that for each i ∈ N ,
zi =
{
(i, 3d∗) if i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
0 otherwise.
Let pˆ ∈ Rm+ be such that for each b ∈ M , pˆb = 3d∗. We show that z1 ∈ D(R′′1 , pˆ),
and for each i ∈ N\{1}, zi ∈ D(Ri , pˆ). This implies that (z, pˆ) ∈ W (R′′1 , R−1), and
thus, by p = pmin(R′′1 , R−1), we conclude that p1 ≤ pˆ1 = 3d∗.
Note that by pˆ ∈ Rm++ and (i) of Lemma 2, for each (A1, t1) ∈ D(R′′1 , pˆ), |A1| ≤ 1,
and for each i ∈ N\{1} and each (Ai , ti ) ∈ D(Ri , pˆ), |Ai | ≤ 1.
Let i ∈ N . We have three subcases.
Subcase 1-1: i = 1. By 1c′′ and pˆ ∈ Rm++, for each b ∈ M\{1},
V ′′1 (b; (1, pˆ1)) = V ′′1 (b; (1, 3d∗)) < 0 < pˆb.
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Thus for each b ∈ M\{1}, (1, pˆ1) P ′1 (b, pˆb). Also by 1c′′ and first object monotonic-
ity, V ′′1 (∅; (1; pˆ1)) = V ′′1 (∅; (1, 3d∗)) < 0, which implies (1, pˆ1) P ′1 0. Thus,
z1 = (1, pˆ1) ∈ D(R′′1 , pˆ).
Subcase 1-2: i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. By ic and pˆ ∈ Rm++, for each b ∈ M\{i},
Vi (b; (i, pi )) = Vi (b; (i, 3d∗)) < 0 < pb.
Thus, for each b ∈ M\{i}, (i, pˆi ) Pi (b, pˆb). Also by ic and first object monotonicity,
Vi (∅; (i, pˆi )) = Vi (∅; (i, 3d∗)) < 0, which implies (i, pˆi ) Pi 0. Thus, zi = (i, pˆi ) ∈
D(Ri , pˆ).
Subcase 1-3: i ∈ {m+1, . . . , n}. For each b ∈ M , Vi (b; 0) = 3d∗ = pˆb. This implies
0 Ri (b, pˆb). Thus, zi = 0 ∈ D(Ri , pˆ).
Case 2: a ∈ {2 . . . ,m}. Let i = a. Suppose by contradiction that pa ≤ 3d∗. Note
that by n < m and (i) of Lemma 3, p ∈ Rm++. Thus by (i) of Lemma 2, for each
(Ai , ti ) ∈ D(Ri , p), |Ai | ≤ 1. By pa ≤ 3d∗, i = a, ic, and p ∈ Rm++, for each
b ∈ M\{a},
Vi (b; (a, pa)) ≤ Vi (b; (i, 3d∗)) < 0 < pb.
Thus for each b ∈ M\{a}, (a, pa) Pi (b, pb). Also by i = a, pa ≤ 3d∗, ic,
and first object monotonicity, Vi (∅; (a, pa)) ≤ Vi (∅; (i, 3d∗)) < 0, which implies
(a, pa) Pi 0. Therefore, D(Ri , p) = {(a, pa)}. Since f (R′′1 , R−1) ∈ ZWmin(R′′1 , R−1),
Ai (R′′1 , R−1) = a. This contradicts A1(R′′1 , R−1) = a. unionsq
Recall that (1, 3d∗) P1 0 and for each a ∈ M\{1}, (1, 3d∗) R1 (a, 3d∗). By Claim
1, t (1) ≤ 3d∗ and for each a ∈ M\{1}, t (a) > 3d∗. Thus,
(1, t (1)) R1 (1, 3d∗) P1 0,
and for each a ∈ M\{1},
(1, t (1)) R1 (1, 3d∗) R1 (a, 3d∗) P1 (a, t (a)).
Therefore, (ii) of Lemma 11 implies A1(R) = ∅ and for each a ∈ M\{1}, A1(R) = a.
By Step 3, |A1(R)| ≤ 1, because otherwise there exists an agent i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such
that Ai (R) = ∅, which contradicts Step 3. Hence, A1(R) = 1. 
Step 5: For each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, Ai (R) = i .
We show that for each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, Ai (R) ⊆ {i, i − 1}. Then, since A1(R) = 1
by Steps 3 and 4, we conclude that for each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, Ai (R) = i .
Suppose by contradiction that there is i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that Ai (R)  {i − 1, i}.
By Lemma 4, there is a ∈ M\{i − 1, i} such that Ai (R) = a. By a ∈ M\{i − 1, i}
and ia, Vi (a; 0) = d∗. Thus, by Step 2 and Lemma 6,
Vi (∅; fi (R)) ≥ −d∗ = Vi (a; 0) − 2d∗ ≥ ti (R) − 2d∗. (1)
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Fig. 11 Illustration of z′ when A1 = {1, 2, 3}
Let j ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n}. By Step 3 and Step 4, A j (R) = ∅, and thus, by Lemma 5,
f j (R) = 0. Thus, by the def. of R j ,
Vj (a; f j (R)) = Vj (a; 0) = 3d∗. (2)
Therefore, by (1), (2), and t j (R) = 0,
Vi (∅; fi (R)) + Vj (a; f j (R)) ≥ ti (R) − 2d∗ + 3d∗ > ti (R) = ti (R) + t j (R).
This contradicts Lemma 8. 
Step 6: Completing the proof.
For each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, by Step 2, Vi (∅; fi (R)) ≥ −d∗, by ia, Vi (i; 0) = 4d∗,
and by Lemma 6 and Step 5, ti (R) ≤ Vi (Ai (R); 0) = Vi (i; 0). Thus, for each i ∈
{2, . . . ,m},
Vi (∅; fi (R)) ≥ −d∗ = Vi (i; 0) − 5d∗ ≥ ti (R) − 5d∗. (3)
By A1(R) = 1, there is A1 ∈ M such that 1 ∈ A1 and
V1(A1; f1(R)) − t1(R) = max
A′1∈M1
{V1(A′1; f1(R)) − t1(R)}.
By A1(R) = 1, Lemma 6, and Lemma 9, t1(R) ∈ [0, V1(1; 0)]. Thus, by the def. of
t1,
V1(A1; f1(R)) − t1(R) ≥ t1. (4)
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Let N ′ ≡ {i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} : Ai (R) ⊆ A1}. Let z′ ≡ ((A′i , t ′i ))i∈N ∈ Z be such that
z′1 = (A1, V1(A1; f1(R))),
z′i = (∅, Vi (∅; fi (R))) for each i ∈ N ′, and
z′i = fi (R) for each i ∈ N\(N ′ ∪ {1}).
Figure 11 is an illustration of z′ when A1 = {1, 2, 3}.
Clearly, for each i ∈ N , z′i Ii fi (R). ByStep 5 and 1 ∈ A1, |N ′| = |A1|−1 ≤ m−1.
Thus, 5|N ′|d∗ ≤ 5(m − 1)d∗ < t1, Therefore, by (3), (4), and 5|N ′|d∗ < t1,
∑
i∈N
t ′i = V1(A1; f1(R)) +
∑
i∈N ′




≥ t1(R) + t1 +
∑
i∈N ′
(ti (R) − 5d∗) +
∑
i∈N\(N ′∪{1})
ti (R) (by (3) and (4))







ti (R). (by 5|N ′|d∗ < t1)
This contradicts efficiency. 
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